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Interest Organizations and European Integration 
 
To be published in: Ronald Holzhacker and Erik Albaek, (eds.), 2006, Democratic 
Governance and European Integration: Society, State and Institutions, London: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the influence of European integration on the relationship between 
state administration and private interests in the four Nordic countries – Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway and Finland. By private interests I mean interest organizations, private 
corporations and independent expertsi. The paper focuses exclusively on the national 
policy processes that are involved with managing European Union (EU) issues.  More 
specifically, this paper discusses two aspects of multi-level governance.  First is the 
important role of private interests in the coordination of decision making at the national 
level preceding their government’s representation of national interests in the European 
Council of Ministers and other EU organizations.  Second is the effect of all this on 
national democratic systems. 
   I will show that in all four countries private interests have been integrated with political 
administrative agencies and political institutions as a precursor for national governments 
to take part in EU related policy processes.  Some of these EU oriented institutional 
arrangements create new forms of corporatist relationships between private interests and 
public agencies. I will also show that these new forms of corporatism challenge existing 
democratic ideals.  Furthermore, new democratic ideals have developed in an effort to 
legitimize the delegation of political authority to the new corporatist relationships 
between private interests and public agencies. 
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Research questions 
Theories of corporatist decision-making processes often describe the relationship 
between political institutions and private interests as one in which special interests have 
either attained the opportunity to manage their own interests at the cost of the common 
interest (Lowi 1979, Williamson 1989), or conversely, have been subordinated to the 
interests of administrative or political actors. Recent theories about corporatism provide a 
third possibility, raising questions as to whether the corporatist decision-making process 
can be considered to be one in which interests meet “… in mutual dialogue [to] achieve 
compromise concerning which policy is best for both parties” (Rothstein & Bergstrøm 
1999: 12). In this paper it is assumed that interest organizations and private firms, similar 
to political institutions and administrative agencies, have pre-given and opposing 
interests.  However, it is an empirical question whether these are independent of or 
dependent on other interests, whether these opposing interests are coordinated at the 
national level, and whether these interests are somehow aggregated so as to establish a 
truly national interest. 
   In turn, this is first a question of whether private interests are included or excluded---
that is, integrated with---administrative and political interests.  In other words, are private 
interests in or out of EU related policy processes? Next it is a question of whether 
administrative agencies, while attending to EU related matters, engage in internal 
coordination. Are EU related policy processes coordinated between the political 
administration’s different agencies? Does politico-administrative coordination take 
place? Furthermore, it is a question of whether coordination of private and public 
interests takes place. Does corporatist coordination take place to the degree that private 
interests in an institutionalized way are involved with administrative agencies in 
negotiating EU related national policies? Finally it is a question of whether such 
coordination leads to the formulation of a national interest. Is a coordination of public 
and private interests taking place in such a manner that interests are aggregated into a 
national interest ii? 
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   It follows that there are potentially three means of managing public and 
private interests in relation to EU issues and organizations. In the first instance, the 
political institutions may single-handedly make decisions on behalf of the common good. 
This is called the within strategy insofar as private interests are held outside the national 
coordination of policymaking. In the second instance, private interests cooperate with 
public authorities in various ways to coordinate public and private interests.   This 
process enables subsequently the national authority to manage interests in relation to EU 
organizations. This is labeled the go-through strategy insofar as multiple parties are 
granted a voice in national deliberations on EU related policies and strategies (Averytt 
1977, Greenwood 1997, Hayes-Renshaw, Mazey & Richardson 1993, Pedersen & 
Pedersen 2000, Pedersen 2001, Wallace & Wallace 1996). In the third instance, private 
interests circumvent national authorities and go directly to the European institutions to 
influence them. This is called the by-pass strategy insofar as private interests choose to 
avoid the national authorities altogether (Averytt 1977, Pedersen & Pedersen 2000, 
Pedersen 2001). iii
   As such, this paper is guided by two sets of research questions.  The first set involves 
the role of private interests in EU matters at the national level:  Are private interests 
engaged in national policy processes related to EU matters? Is corporatist coordination 
taking place? Is a national interest formulated? 
   The second set of questions relates to the democratic input of private interests. In 
theories about how multi-level governance influences national democratic systems the 
role of corporatist arrangements at the national level is seldom addressed.  Instead, these 
theories have been concerned mainly with the EU as an institutional ensemble and with 
the demands that this places on the European Union, such as its legality and legitimacy 
(Lodge 1994, Hayward 1995, Laffan 1996, Obradovic 1996, Weiler 1996, Hansen and 
Williams 1999). Moreover, these theories have dealt with considerations of the standards 
of legality and legitimacy to which the EU should conform and how the EU often fails to 
live up to these ideals.  In this paper I shall do something different.  First, I shall only deal 
with the democratic consequences of EU related policy making for national democratic 
systems and not for the whole of the EU as an institutional ensemble. Second, I will 
assess the democratic consequences instead of evaluating the degree to which the EU 
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does or does not live up to a set of ideal or abstract ideas of how a “good democracy” is 
supposed to be organized and function.  As such, the second set of research questions 
involves how national policy making around EU issues affects democracy.  Specifically, 
based on a historical and empirical analysis, how can the democratic consequences of the 
involvement of private interest in national coordination be assessed?  Are national 
democratic ideals and traditions being challenged?  
 
Methodology 
This paper is based partly on a comparative investigation conducted in 1998 in which a 
questionnaire was sent to 1,323 administrative agencies in the central administration of 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. iv It concerns the central administration of these 
four relatively small states that are all integrated in the Nordic community, but where 
factors such as EU affiliation, EU strategies, general administrative systems, and 
historical and political circumstances vary considerably. This means that the Nordic 
states provide a first-rate laboratory in which to study the development of corporatist 
arrangements in connection with European integration. Results of the comparative 
analysis indicate that private interests in all four countries have gained a voice in the 
politico-administrative processes preceding national representation in European 
organizations. Furthermore, results show that there is a significant difference among the 
four countries as to whether this has evolved into a process of corporatist coordination 
involving political parties and state agencies as well as private interests.  There are also 
differences among these four countries as to whether an aggregation of interests occurs 
establishing possibilities for national governments to represent a national interest in EU 
policy processes. Finally, results indicate that the relationships between the parties are 
influenced by the way in which the national coordination system has been constructed 
and by whether a country is a formal EU member and, if so, for how long it has been a 
member.  
   To evaluate the democratic consequences of corporatist coordination the assessment 
will be divided into two parts (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004: 131-32). The first 
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part is concerned with democracy.  It addresses the question of which democratic ideals 
form the basis for evaluating the consequences for national states of multi-level 
governance. This stems from the claim that European integration has led to changes in 
democratic ideals and, consequently, in the ideals upon which the evaluation is based. 
The second part is concerned with politics.  It addresses the question of who actually 
controls democratic government in these Nordic countries when it comes to EU related 
issues?  This stems from the claim that European integration has changed the scope of 
politics. My analysis will be based on the ideals of everyday integration, that is, the 
European integration undertaken within the framework of the acquis communautaire, 
which had been established by 1998.  It will also be based on an examination of the real 
distribution of political authority in connection with everyday integration. In this way, I 
will carry out two analyses: One that deals with democratic ideals, which were 
formulated in connection with the entry of Nordic countries into the EU (Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland) or at least their adaptation to it (Norway not being a formal member of 
EU); another that deals to whom political authority has actually been delegated or granted 
in connection with the performance of EU related tasks. Results indicate that democratic 
ideals are challenged, even if ideals have been transformed in the light of experiences 
with European integration. Results also indicate that corporatist coordination is one 
aspect of a general trend toward a bureaucratization of the national EU related politics 
and politicization of the national EU related bureaucracy. 
      
Coordination  – are private interests in or out? 
The first question to answer is: Are private interests included in or excluded from EU 
related national policy processes? This question will be answered in several steps. The 
first is to compare the extent of the contacts v between authorities and private interests in 
connection with managing EU related issues as well as whether private interests are 
represented in committees where matters related to the EU are attended to.   
 In Denmark this contact goes most intensively to the organizations (35% to 
organizations, 23% to private firms at least once a month); in Sweden and Norway it goes 
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equally to organizations as to corporations; in Finland it goes to a greater degree to 
corporations. Norwegian authorities have the least intensive contacts – both to 
organizations and corporations. There are also major differences between the four 
countries when it comes to the form of contact. 54% of the responding agencies in 
Finland indicate that the contact is informal while a mere 12% believe that they are of a 
formal character (i.e., takes place in writing, in formal meetings, or in hearings). In 
contrast, 64% in Denmark regard the contact as formal while 39% believe it to be 
informal vi. The contact is most formal in Denmark followed by Norway while it is most 
informal in Finland followed by Sweden.  
       Private interests however are not integrated via contact alone. Involvement also 
occurs through representation in public committees of varied character. vii There are 
significant differences in terms of the extent to which the administration utilizes public 
committees and adhoc groups in connection with the handling of EU related matters. 
Sweden and Finland rely heavily on ad hoc groups for the management of EU matters. 
Denmark and Norway do so to a lesser degree. In contrast, private interests are to a 
higher degree represented in ad hoc groups and public committees in Denmark than in 
Sweden and Norway. Private interests are only represented in 28% of these committees in 
Finland while in Denmark the same goes for 54%. 
 Based on these primary findings it can be assumed that all four nations have 
chosen to involve private interests, both through representation in public committees and 
through contacts. None of the four countries accordingly have chosen to let the national 
administrations handle EU related policy processes single-handedly. Neither the within 
nor the by-pass strategy is predominant. Even so there are differences between the 
countries and these can be found on at least three levels: First, Denmark involves private 
interests more often in administrative working groups and committees than the three 
other countries. Second, Sweden and Norway provide both organizations and firms with 
representation while in Denmark there is an unambiguous emphasis on organizations. 
Third, Sweden has the most open administration in the sense that total involvement 
through contact and representation is highest. In the Swedish case openness builds on a 
combination of informal rather than formal contact, and involvement via representation 
rather than via contact.  
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 Other important distinctions become apparent if we include independent experts 
as a third category of private interests.viii  Regarding the involvement of experts, Norway 
is at the absolute top and Denmark at the absolute bottom. In general the numbers 
indicate that organizations are better represented than firms and experts, but also that the 
traditional notion that corporatist representation typically will involve associations and 
not individuals and collective organizations and not single companies is now challenged 
– both by individual experts and single firms.  
 
National coordination 
The second step in answering the first research questions will deal with the extent to 
which contact with and representation of private interests can be said to be a part of 
efforts to develop corporatist coordination of national-level decision making about EU 
matters? This will be done from three angles. First, I will investigate whether the 
agencies that have contact with private interests and that are engaged in public 
committees with private interests also are in contact with EU organizations. Is the 
coordination with private interests part of a broader effort to coordinate relations with EU 
organizations? Second, I will investigate whether the agencies with contact to private 
interests also have contact with other national administrative agencies. Is the coordination 
of private interests part of a broader effort to coordinate public and private interests and, 
therefore, to be defined as corporatist coordination? Third, I will investigate whether 
private interests by-pass national authorities by going directly to the European 
organizations. Is corporatist coordination a dominant strategy or merely one among 
several alternative strategies of coordinating interests vis-à-vis the EU?   
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Table 1  In the last year, has EU-work increased the coordination between the agency 
and interest organizations/corporations in agencies that actually have contact 
with interest organizations and firms in connection with EU issues? 1998. 
Percent. 
 
 Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Nordic 
countries 
Quite correct 2 6 10 8 7 
Correct  36 58 36 47 44 
Incorrect  26 20 20 17 21 
Quite incorrect 15 2 17 9 11 
Do not know 22 14 17 20 18 
 
Table 1 shows that in general, coordination has increased in the four countries, which 
further indicates that all Nordic countries have chosen to grant private interests voice 
instead of allowing the national administration to handle EU issues alone. Even if 
Denmark is the country where the EU has increased coordination the most, differences 
among the countries are not dramatic, but nevertheless show a divergence between the 
‘full’ members (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the ‘half’ member (Norway not 
being a full member but part of the single market by a special agreement). Table 1 shows 
that 64% of the Danish agencies indicate that it is correct that coordination between the 
agency and private interests has increased. Norway is in a class unto itself. 
 To determine whether the coordination with private interests is part of corporatist 
coordination, I will compare the number of agencies that have contact with EU 
institutions with the number of agencies that are also in contact with private interests. At 
the same time I will compare the number of agencies that are in contact with other state 
agencies as well as with private interests in the same context. The purpose in both cases 
is to determine whether the relationship between the agency and private interests can be 
considered to be part of efforts designed to coordinate a plurality of public and private 
interests in connection with the management of EU related issues.  In other words, the 
idea is to determine whether coordination with private interests is part of a broader effort 
toward coordination of private and public interests and whether coordination can be 
defined as corporatist coordination. 
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Table 2  Agencies in contact with EU organizations and national private interests 
(interest organizations or corporations) in connection with the management of 
EU issues in the course of the last year.  
 
  Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Nordic 
countries 
General 
administration Total 69 62 67 68 67 
 Never 31 38 33 32 34 
 Often 28 35 36 38 34 
EU- 
Administration Total 93 94 87 87 90 
 Never  7 6 13 13 10 
 Often 59 67 53 55 59 
Core-segment Total 100 99 91 91 95 
 Never  0 1 9 9 5 
 Often 79 75 62 56 68 
Note: “Total” encompasses all declarations of participation, regardless of intensity in the 
course of the last year. “Often” is defined as ‘once a month or more frequently’. 
 
Generally speaking, table 2 suggests that there is a significant relationship between the 
agencies in contact with private interests and those in contact with EU organizations. 
Differences between the countries are limited but in all four countries there are only a 
segment of all agencies that are in contact with private interests as well as with EU 
organizations. In all countries this segment stands out compared to the central 
administration in general and to the part of the administration that is involved in handling 
EU related issues (the EU administration). The segment is roughly the same size in the 
respective countries, though slightly larger in Norway and Denmark than in Sweden and 
Finland. The same conclusion is evident when it comes to which agencies are in contact 
with EU organizations while at the same time in contact with private interests and other 
state agencies. In all countries a segment of the administrative agencies are involving 
private interests in their contacts with EU organizations and other state agencies and are 
doing so more intensively than the rest of the state agencies.  
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 As such, it is possible to draw three conclusions thus far.  First, it is evident that 
coordination takes place in all four countries.  Second, only a fraction (a segment) of the 
administrative agencies takes part in this coordination.  Third, even if agencies in contact 
with EU organizations are also in contact with national private interests, not all agencies 
in contact with private interests concerning EU matters are in contact with EU 
organizations. 
 
Corporatist coordination – a dominant strategy? 
Even if coordination does take place, it has yet to be shown whether corporatist 
coordination is a dominant strategy, or if it instead merely represents one among several 
alternative ways of coordination. Taking this third step I will examine the degree to 
which private interests choose to go through the public authorities or by-pass them. 
Generally speaking, only 13% of the administrative agencies believe that private interests 
“often” seek to circumvent the administration; 33% believe that they “occasionally” or 
“rarely” do so. On average, 18% report that interests do not do so while 36% do not 
know. Even if these numbers are based on assessments from administrative agencies, 
they confirm that private interests chose corporatist coordination as the dominant 
strategy.ix The second question is the degree to which state agencies also chose this 
strategy as the dominant one. Are private interests included or excluded to the extent that 
coordination must primarily be viewed to be politico-administrative and only secondarily 
corporatist? Comparing the four countries indicates that coordination in Sweden and 
Finland is predominantly politico-administrative with less emphasis on coordination 
involving private interests.  In the Danish case a more balanced integration of 
administrative agencies and private interests is apparent. The data also show that not all 
coordination involves just interests; it may also include coordination between state 
agencies both with and without private interests. As such, there are important differences 
regarding the extent to which private interests are integrated in coordination. These 
differences become particularly evident when comparing the extent to which agencies 
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believe that coordination with other authorities (within their own area or in other policy 
fields) has been increased in relation to their coordination with private interests.  
 Finland is a particular case in this context.  In Finland there is a significant 
difference in the assessment of the degree to which coordination has increased within 
one’s own ministry (67%), with administrative agencies in other ministries (69%), and 
with private interests (41%). At the same time, however, the Finish agencies report that 
contact with interest organizations is relatively low.  Relative to other countries, few 
Finish agencies) believes that organizations and corporations are represented to a “great 
degree” or “somewhat” in groups and committees that have managed EU related matters. 
Sweden represents a slightly different case, but with the same conclusion. So there is 
evidence to indicate that in these two countries the formal integration with the EEC has 
continued a tradition for corporatist cooperation, but that the internal politico-
administrative coordination in particular has been increased and, as a result, has become 
the dominant strategy. In the Danish case a greater balance between politico-
administrative coordination and coordination involving private interests is evident. 61% 
of administrative agencies report that coordination within the ministry has been 
increased; 50% report that coordination between ministries has increased; and 47% report 
that coordination with private interests has increased. At the same time Denmark is the 
country where coordination with private interests is believed to have increased the most 
just as contact with private interests is reported to be among the most intensive and the 
most comprehensivex. Data then indicate that in the Danish case EU integration has both 
increased politico-administrative coordination and corporatist coordination.  For this 
reason it can be argued that only in Denmark has integration led to corporatist 
coordination being as important as politico-administrative coordination. 
 There are several possible explanations for this. First, it can be claimed that EU 
integration runs along traditional paths for corporatist cooperation (i.e., corporatist path 
dependency).  This can explain why private interests in all four countries have been 
granted voice in EU related decision-making and why the difference between politico-
administrative and corporatist coordination is limited under any circumstances. Second, it 
can be claimed that EU integration depends on traditional paths for the organization of 
 13
the relationship between government and administration (i.e., administrative path 
dependency).  This can explain why contacts with private interests in Sweden and 
Finland are predominantly informal but also more intensive whereas in Denmark and 
Norway they are predominantly formal and less intensive (Jacobsson, Lægreid and 
Pedersen, 2004: 93-95). Third, it can be claimed that the form of association with the EU 
has significance. In the three full member states (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland), 
coordination in general---including with private interests---has increased more than in 
Norway, which is by special agreement allowed to participate in the EU Commission’s 
expert committees and working groups, but not in the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, 
the difference between the four countries is modest.  
 
National interest 
In the fourth and final step answering the first research questions I will now examine the 
character of corporatist coordination. The question is whether coordination leads to an 
aggregation of interests into a national interest (Almond & Powel 1978: 198). In this 
context I will distinguish between two forms of “national interest.”  First is the national 
interest as determined by a national standpoint.  Here coordination occurs such that 
participation in the Council of Ministers allows the government to represent an 
established majority in the national parliament based on an institutionalized aggregation 
of administrative, political, and private interests prior to the government’s participation in 
the Council of Ministers.  Second is the national interest as determined by the 
government’s standpoint.  Here coordination occurs such that the government can 
represent itself without a documented majority in the parliament but based on politico-
administrative coordination that the government itself has deemed necessary prior to 
participation in the Council of Ministers.  
 First, let us look at the individual agencies’ assessments of whether it has become 
more frequent to develop a national interest in the management of EU matters.  The 
difference between countries is significant – mainly between Finland on the one side and 
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Norway on the other. In Finland, 65% believe that it has become more common to 
develop a national interest. In Norway only 27% believe the same. In Sweden and 
Denmark the distribution is more moderate – around 45% believe that it has become 
more common. In this context it becomes apparent that formal membership plays a role, 
just as the organizational arrangement of the coordination system possibly does so. 
However, the most important factor in this context is that between 45-65% in countries 
with full membership report that it has become more common to develop a national 
interest, which serves to indicate that coordination is oriented towards aggregation as a 
means of defining a standpoint.  
 Second, let us look at the agencies’ assessments of the degree of disagreement in 
the decision-making process between pubic authorities and private interests. In the four 
countries 61% believe that the degree of disagreement is “small” or “quite small”. 
Similarly, there is only a limited difference in terms of whether the disagreement is “quite 
large” or “large”. The numbers indicate that interplay between authorities and interests 
involve much consensus, which also suggests that coordination is oriented towards 
aggregation.  
 Third, let us look at whether administrative agencies have succeeded in winning 
the acceptance of private interests for their views and formulations as an indicator of the 
extent of coordination. The extent to which the agencies report that they have succeeded 
“quite well” or “well” to win private acceptance for public interests indicates that the 
processes are “dominated” by the administrative agencies and therefore politico-
administrative rather than aggregative.  In the event that they are more mixed in their 
assessment (i.e., that there is greater balance between “very good” and “good” on the one 
side, and “bad” or “very bad” on the other side) indicates that the processes involve an 
aggregation of public and private interests. The numbers reveal that agencies have had 
some success in winning the acceptance of interest organizations to the agencies’ views 
and formulations. Hence, coordination is somewhat more aggregative than politico-
administrative.  That said, there is still an element of the latter at work insofar as there is 
no assessment of whether the politico-administrative agencies unilaterally (”very well” or 
”well”) succeed in realizing their views in relation to private interests. 
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 Fourth, let us look at the degree to which administrative agencies consider 
opinions forwarded by the affected parties, consumer groups, and clients in the execution 
of EU related issues as an indicator of the extent of coordination. If agencies grant such 
opinions less weight than the technical and professional opinions forwarded by the 
government, then this indicates that coordination is more politico-administrative than 
aggregative and vice versa.  The data show that agencies grant technical and professional 
perspectives greater weight than opinions offered by the government and affected parties.  
Conversely, however, they place greater weight on the opinions of special interests than 
on those offered by the government. While professional and political perspectives, on the 
one side, and those of special interests, on the other side, do not necessarily have to be 
opposed to one another, the data suggest that the views of special interests are granted 
greater weight than are those of the government.  Moreover, the views of the 
professionals are granted greater weight than those of anyone else.  
 Based on all of these findings, it is apparent that coordination involves an 
aggregation of public as well as private interests. The evidence at hand does not make a 
more precise conclusion possible.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that coordination does not 
take place exclusively in politico-administrative terms (within), but that both public and 
private interests are combined (go-through). Over all, this suggests the following: 
Corporatist coordination takes place within the framework of politico-administrative 
coordination where in all four countries private interests have participated with a 
significant voice and that this has helped to aggregate politico-administrative and private 
interests. That said, it is probably only in Denmark where a system of corporatist 
coordination has been established and only in Denmark is it the case that that politico-
administrative and private interests in general are combined.  In Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway it is equally clear that the politico-administrative coordination is relatively more 
significant than corporatist coordination.  Therefore, it can --with some hesitation -- be 
concluded that a national standpoint is formulated in Denmark while in Sweden and 
Finland a government’s standpoint is put together and that between the three countries 
there are varieties of defining national interests.  
 There are several explanations for these differences. The most important is 
probably that the national coordination system in Denmark is constructed in such a 
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manner that the government is obliged to integrate private interests in the administrative 
coordination prior to its participation in the Council of Ministers and that the government 
is obliged to have a mandate from a majority in the national parliament before negotiating 
in the Council. Hence, the formal character of coordination system as well as the 
politically binding power of the mandate leads to the formulation of a national standpoint 
through a process of aggregation of public and private interests (Pedersen 2002). In 
Sweden and Finland it is different. In these two countries the government alone is 
obligated to hear or inform the parliament but in the Council the government can 
represent itself without a documented majority in the parliament.  Instead, these 
governments need only engage in whatever coordination and consultation they deem 
necessary prior to participation in the Council of Ministers.  
 
Democratic consequences 
European integration, full membership or not, entails that the relationship between 
private interests and public authorities is intensive.  Integration also leads to the 
construction of new and more national channels for contact with the public 
administration. Corporations and organizations have the opportunity to utilize these 
channels in two ways: By circumventing or by-passing the national administration and 
initiating contact directly with European institutions or by going through the national 
administration to take care of interests in the European decision-making process. The 
same is true for public authorities. They can choose to by pass private interests and attend 
to the common interest through politico-administrative processes or by granting voice to 
private interests through contact and representation.  Let us now consider the democratic 
consequences of these alternative possibilities for national political systems.  This 
evaluation will be based on a historical and empirical comparison of democratic ideals 
with the scope of political authority. Are EU related policy processes under the control 
and management of politicians—that is, elected members of parliament—or by appointed 
members of the government? 
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   In the Nordic countries since the 1970s everyday integration has given rise to the 
development of at least five democratic ideals (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 2004: 
133ff.). All five of them deal with questions related to the distribution of political 
authority and, consequently, with the national division of power. In identifying these five 
idealsxi and in comparing them with political reality the following three methodological 
requirements must be followed:  (1) The assessment must be contextual. It must be based 
on the fact that the scope of politics as well of the democratic ideals will always be 
country dependent and conditioned by the period under study. (2) The evaluation must be 
dynamic. It should take account of the fact that political power, like democratic ideals, is 
subject to continual change. (3) Finally, the evaluation should possess an authoritative 
basis. It must be based on interpretations of the democratic ideals as well as of political 
authority laid down by political agencies, such as parliament, government, and the courts 
(Pedersen, 1998, 1999, Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004).  The five ideas in 
question are as follows: 
 
1. The ideal of parliamentary government.  This is based on the idea that while the 
government has the power to represent national interests in the EU this must occur within 
the framework of the overarching authority of the parliament assigned to it by the 
national constitution or by specific legislation. 
2. The ideal of sovereignty.  This is based on the idea that national governments - and not 
the EU - should determine how the government and the administration ought to be 
organized with the aim of representing national interests in the EU. 
3. The ideal of adaptation.  This is the idea that the government, understood as an 
organization, and the national administrative system – its organization, procedures and 
processes - should be adapted to European development and that it is the responsibility of 
the government to decide and to implement this adaptation. 
4. The ideal of neutrality.  This is the idea that there must be internal coordination within 
policy areas as well as between ministries and that this coordination must follow 
professional standards of political neutrality. Two secondary ideals are associated with 
this ideal: One deals with objectivity and the other deals with the efficient furthering of 
interests.  The ideal of objectivity implies that the most objectively competent authority 
 18
should assume responsibility for the coordination. The ideal of efficiency implies that the 
most important private and public interests should be coordinated and that this should 
result in an efficient representation of national interests in the EU as well as the most 
efficient implementation of EU legislation on the national level. 
5. The ideal of transparency and participation.  This is the idea that the relevant parties 
in particular should be given sufficient insight and participation to permit their interests 
to influence the coordination of the government’s or the national standpoint and that the 
public should be given insight into the political decision-making process. A secondary 
ideal of consensus is associated with this fifth ideal. The ideal of consensus implies that 
interests should be coordinated via negotiation and compromise rather than by voting and 
instruction. This ideal also implies that private interests are included in coordination on a 
voluntary basis. Private interests are free to participate and when participating they 
cannot be instructed (i.e. by decision or decree be ordered to) by neither parliament nor 
government.  They are also free to by-pass national public organizations at there own 
will. 
 
   On the one hand, these five ideals show how the number of those who are considered to 
be legitimate participants in the political and administrative representation of national 
interests is extended – all relevant political and administrative, regional and local, private 
and public interests should be able in principle to participate and the most important 
interests should be coordinated in principle. On the other hand, they also show that only 
very general and imprecise norms have been developed with regard to procedures 
involving democratic government. For example, there are differences between the four 
countries in the extent to which norms detail which political institutions, administrative 
agencies, and private interests should be regarded as relevant and important. In sum, this 
produces a situation where the group of legitimate participants is in principle unlimited, 
but where it remains unclear who is responsible for delimiting the number of relevant 
parties. The domain of politics can expand without this necessarily implying the 
concurrent extension of democratic government. 
 In the following, I will compare political reality with these democratic ideals. I 
will evaluate whether a gap has developed between the democratic ideals and the real-
 19
world expansion of politics, and, if it has, I will assess the consequences this implies for 
democratic government. In other words, I will address how everyday integration 
challenges (or not) democratic government.  I will argue that governments are using their 
sovereignty to decide the organization of the administration and the government itself in 
adapting to EU integration. Finally, I will also argue that there are indications that 
administrative agencies are following the ideal of objectivity in the distribution of 
responsibilities, that the distribution of representation is efficient, and that the 
implementation of EU norms and rules is relatively high compared to other EU member 
states. Consequently, it would not be reasonable to describe national-level EU policy 
making as undemocratic.  Even so, the comparison of ideals and reality reveals four 
democratic challenges linked to the interplay of private and public interests.  The two 
most important of these challenges are bureaucratization of the national EU related 
politics and politicization of the national EU related bureaucracy. 
 
Four challenges 
 1. Bureaucratization. In all four countries the bureaucratization of EU issues is a 
general phenomenon, which reveals the extent to which it is civil servants and not 
governments or parliaments that manage EU questions. In general the administrative 
agencies (i.e., the civil servants or the bureaucracy) possess a considerable freedom to 
draft and prepare (and in certain instances even to decide) policies and legislation. For 
example, a considerable surfeit of informal contacts is undertaken autonomously from 
parliaments and even sometimes detached from the government's (or the minister's) 
participation and insight. Even in the Danish case, where there are more formal than 
informal contacts and where the informal contacts generally comprise a “shadow” 
(Scharpf 1997) to the formal ones, there are several examples of corporatist coordination 
not oriented to the mandating procedure. There are also several examples of 
administrative units handling EU matters independently from parliamentary supervision 
and from control from the side of governments (Esmark 2002, Højbjerg 2002). According 
to the ideal of parliamentary government, any activity that involves the formulation, 
 20
ratification, or implementation of rules with general application must follow specific 
legislative procedures.  Instead, politico-administrative processes take place 
autonomously from the parliament and from governments control. It is against this 
background that the first challenge to democratic governance arises: The administrative 
agencies possess considerable freedom and autonomy in handling EU matters.  This 
freedom and autonomy is greatest in countries where no mandating procedure exists and 
where coordination is not concentrated in formal committees. Accordingly, the 
democratic challenge is greatest in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, but is not 
inconsiderable in Denmark. 
 2. Politicization. There are differences from country to country and from case to 
case in the factors that administrations take into account in preparing a governmental 
standpoint or a national standpoint. In most instances it is left open to the administrative 
agencies themselves to decide the extent to which the political agencies should be 
consulted; when it is to take place; and how such contacts should be organized. This also 
applies to contacts with other administrative authorities and with private interests. Only 
in the Danish case have limits been set on the independence of the administration in this 
respect. The point at which the line has been crossed between administrative coordination 
(in which only public authorities are required to be consulted), political coordination (in 
which political institutions, such as parliaments, parties, and party groups, must be 
consulted) and corporatist coordination (in which private interests must be consulted), is 
something that the administrative agencies normally decide for themselves (Jacobsson, 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). This is where the second challenge to democratic 
government stands out: The coordination process empowers the administration to take 
political decisions. This may occur when the administration determines who is to be 
included in the coordination process, which interests (private and public) are to be taken 
into account, and when, how, and whether political institutions are to be consulted as well 
as offered the possibility to exercise control. Against this background, the challenge is 
that political processes are taking place in detachment from parliamentary supervision 
and from government decisions.  Furthermore, administrative units possess considerable 
autonomy to organize working practices and to formulate the standpoint to be represented 
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by governments in EU organizations but also to decide which interests should be 
consulted, which interests are to be taken into account, and when political control is to 
take place. 
 3. Exclusion. We have seen that many private interests have access to the 
national systems of coordination. However, this openness is not systematic and does not 
follow procedures laid down in advance. The openness that occurs thus depends on 
factors that have little to do with the ideal of transparency and participation. The 
administration is made open as part of an attempt to efficiently represent national 
interests, not in order to enable the transparency and participation of the general public. 
At the same time, it is to a large degree left up to the administrative agencies themselves 
to decide how open they should be. Besides the formal rules giving external interests the 
right to consultation and hearings, it is left up to the administration to decide in which 
contexts consultation should occur, and with what status parties to these consultations 
should enjoy. The EU related administration, on the other hand, seems to be less 
transparent than other parts of the national administrations. In Denmark and Norway, the 
special committees are inaccessible to the general public.  The same applies, to some 
degree, to the European Affairs Committees of the Danish Parliament (Folketing) and the 
Norwegian parliament (Storting). Naturally, the many informal contacts are closed to 
public insight or participation. It is against this background that the third challenge to 
democratic governance arises: There are no procedures by which the general public can 
gain insight into or participation in the national systems of coordination. At the same 
time, however, the EU administration is open, but only in relation to special interests 
selected by the administration. 
 4. Captivity. Empirical studies have shown that national administrations can 
become dependent on external, that is private, interests (Esmark 2002). Interests can 
capture the administration (Lowi 1979). This challenge is made more acute by the fact 
that private interests are able to by-pass the national public authorities and present their 
interests directly to the European organizations. In all four Nordic countries, it is the 
assessment of national administrations that companies and interest organizations make 
use of this opportunity, although not on a large scale or in a systematic manner. But the 
possibility exists and this raises the final challenge: The opportunity for private interests 
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to by-pass the national government and go directly to the EUs organizations in order to 
further their own interests. This provides organizations with the opportunity to avoid 
contact with the national authorities and, as a result, limits governmental control over the 
interests that are allowed to influence initiatives that may later become national law. This 
"detention" limits pluralism just as bypassing alters the conditions for consensus. Private 
organizations can as a “threat” use their ability to by-pass the national administrations 
(Pedersen 1998). 
 Over all, then, it is apparent that there are indicators pointing in the direction of 
democratic challenges but also that the democratic ideals have developed in a dynamic 
fashion to adapt to European integration. With only the four Nordic countries in mind, it 
is to early to talk about a “democratic deficit” at this level of multi-level governance. 
Nonetheless, important challenges are evident insofar as politicians are absent to a very 
great extent from the shaping EU related national policies.  This leads to the conclusion 
that EU politics are becoming bureaucratized and the national EU related bureaucracy is 
becoming politicized while the bureaucracy to some extent has become capable of 
determining the extent to which it wants to be subject to political control from parliament 
and/or the government. This is occurring with a considerable degree of closure with 
respect to the general public as well as in the relationship between the administration and 
special interests as illustrated by the fact that the latter can "capture" the administration 
(Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen 2004). 
 
Summary 
The results presented in this paper are supported by other national studies concerning the 
development of the relationship between administration and organizations in connection 
with the management of interest’s vis-à-vis EU organizations (Sidenius 1998, 1999, 
Pedersen 2002). They are also supported by descriptions of the development of the 
relationship between authorities and interest organizations in general (Christiansen 1998, 
see also Christiansen & Sidenius 1999, Nørgaard and Christiansen 2003, 2003a, Pedersen 
1995), but are contrary to Swedish studies that have shown that since the 1980s a general 
‘de-corporativization’ has taken place (Hermansson 1993, Hermansson et al. 1999, Lewin 
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1992, Micheletti 1994, Rothstein 1992, Rothstein & Bergström 1999). On the basis of the 
data presented here it is difficult to confirm general claims about a ‘de-corporativization’. 
The EU integration does not seem to have weakened the relationships between authorities 
and interests (Pedersen and Pedersen 2001). Not in the Swedish case either, where studies 
have shown a general trend towards de-corporativization.  To the contrary, European 
integration has meant that the number of channels between administration and interests 
has been increased; that the means of managing interests have been combined; that 
contacts are more intensive and extensive; and that representation has taken new forms 
(i.e., becoming more informal than formal).  
 I have also presented evidence indicating that administrative agencies engage in 
relationships to organizations at the same time as organizations adopt a by-pass strategy 
and circumvent national administration by tying contacts to European organizations. And 
that the authorities are providing interests with voice while at the same time adopting a 
within strategy whereby they are undertaking significant coordination without including 
these interests. In all four countries the coordination of a plurality of private and public 
interests is taking place. However, there are significant differences among countries 
regarding the extent to which different interests participate in coordination of EU related 
policymaking.  There are also differences among countries in terms of how coordination 
produces a national standpoint or a governmental standpoint. 
 Several indicators provide evidence that the organization of the national 
coordination system influences the formulation of the standpoint.  In Denmark and 
Norway, the majority of contacts between authorities and interests are formal, which is in 
harmony with the organization of the coordination systems. In Sweden and Finland, the 
majority of contacts are informal, just as there are more internal working groups and 
public committees with EU related matters, as an indication of the organization of the 
coordination system in the two countries. Finally, there are several indicators providing 
evidence that there is not merely a coordination of interests, but also an aggregation of 
interests to form a national interest. This is most clearly the case in Denmark, where the 
national government is obligated to attain the Folketing’s mandate in matters related to 
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the Council of Ministers and is, therefore, obligated to represent the views of a majority 
in the national parliament.   
 
 
 
Notes
 
                                                 
1. By experts I mean people from universities and business colleges that, similar to organizations and 
corporations, are neither subordinate nor superior to a minister or political leadership. 
 
ii   Aggregation of interests is to be understood in the sense that Almond & Powel, among others, 
            utilize the concept: “Political aggregation, then, consists of the processes that combine               
demands into policy alternatives and mobilize resources behind these policy alternatives” (Al                  
mond & Powel, 1978: 198). Aggregation, therefore, simply means that interests are combined to form 
political alternatives that can be forwarded for decision in the parliament, for the government, or in another 
decision-making organ. The reason for raising the question about aggregation is therefore to assume a 
difference between a coordination and an aggregation of interests, and that it is first when interests are both 
coordinated and aggregated that the result can be referred to as a national interest. In that context, 
coordination is defined as a relationship in which administrative, political, and private interests are 
involved without necessarily being combined; just as aggregation is defined by the relationship in which 
administrative, political, and private interests are involved, but are also combined to form political 
alternatives. 
 
 
    iii  In both instances, exit is the foundation for the chosen strategy. In the second instance (corporatist 
coordination) a number of parties are drawn into stable and sustained corporatist coordination and are 
thereby granted a voice (Hirschman 1970, 1981). 
 
 
   iv The response rate was 82%. The agencies were all part of the state, directly subordinate to the 
national government, operated in the entire nation, and had permanent administrative personnel. 
Municipalities and local agencies were not included in the investigation. Further description of this 
investigation can be found in Jacobsson, Lægreid & Pedersen, 2001, p. 36ff, and in Jacobsson, 
Lægreid and Pedersen 2004: 21ff. 
 
 
v Contact’ is here defined as formal or informal, oral or written communication between public and 
private (national and European) agencies dealing with EU related matters within the framework of the 
established acquis communautaire. The number of communications per timeframe assessed by the 
administrative agencies measures the intensivity of these contacts. The extensivity of contacts on the 
other hand is measured by the number of agencies involved in contacts, i.e. are administrative agencies 
in contact with private interests as well as with other agencies and EU organizations or only for 
example in contact with other administrative agencies 
 
vi. The combined response is more than 100, as the respondents have provided multiple answers to 
the individual question.  
 
vii By ’involved’ we mean the private interests’ representation in public committees, established formal-
sized or ad hoc. Interest organizations in Denmark are formally involved in the coordination system 
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through their participation in 13 of the 32 special committees. Norway has followed the Danish example 
and has also established special committees; however, these do not include representatives from private 
interests. Instead, they are involved in so-called reference groups, which are established ad hoc by the 
special committees. Sweden has not introduced a formalized system with special committees as in 
Denmark and Norway. Each department decides for itself, which coordinating organs are to be established 
and who is to participate. In Finland a large number of consultative EU-sections with participation from 
affected departments and authorities, as well as private interests, have been established and are responsible 
for coordinating EU-questions. As such, it is only in Denmark that private interests (interest organizations) 
have attained the right to be represented in formally established decision-making committees.  
 
 
viii It is naturally not without problem to include independent experts under the category private interests. I 
do so in this case as the data clearly reveal that the administration is in a situation where a decision must be 
made as to whether organizations, corporations, or independent experts are to be included in the 
management of EU related matters. The competition becomes apparent in the sense that there are 
significant differences in the four countries whether organizations and/or corporations and/or experts are 
involved. 
 
 
ix Two national Danish surveys asking organizations and private firms to asses there contacts to national 
administrative agencies and political institutions and to EU organizations affirms these findings 
(Christiansen and Nørgaard, 2003: 123ff., 2003a: 32ff.).  They also point to the fact that the by-pass 
strategy is becoming more important during the 1990s and that especially labor market organizations in 
2000 are using the go-through strategy as often as the by-pass. 
 
 
x While there are not as many groups and committees that have been established to manage EU matters in 
Denmark, the administrative agencies find that they meet representatives from private interests more often 
in the existing committees and groups than is the case with the administration in the other Scandinavian 
countries.  
 
 
xi  In identifying ideals a number of public primary and secondary sources have been used – laws and other 
authoritative norms, debates in Parliaments, public statements from Governments or commissions in 
Parliaments, legal evaluations, and decisions by courts and expert commissions (see Højbjerg and Pedersen 
2002). 
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